Abstract-The power grid is a complex, interconnected system that requires the coordination of multiple entities to ensure the reliability of the system. System operators must be aware of the impacts of various natural and man-made contingencies through telemetry from their control systems, and they must also be aware of the integrity and availability of the cyber assets on their systems. A team of researchers from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory have conducted a series of observations and interviews at power utilities to identify what information needs to be available for both control room dispatchers and cyber security analysts to maintain situation awareness of cyber security to effectively monitor the cyber assets on utility control systems. The researchers interviewed and observed control room dispatchers and spoke with regional control system engineers and cyber security analysts to define the context in which such information would be used. The results of this work will inform the design of a tool that will enhance cyber situation awareness and help facilitate effective communication between the various personnel and organizations with utility and other regional authorities during contingencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE power grid is a complex, interconnected system that requires the coordination of multiple organizations to ensure the reliability of the system. Electric utilities and grid operators serve in various roles including transmission operators, balancing authorities and regional reliability coordinators to monitor and maintain grid reliability. System operating limits, planned maintenance outages, interchange scheduling and other operational data must be communicated across these organizations in real-time. In order for system operators to be aware of the impacts on their systems from various natural and man-made contingencies, they must maintain awareness of the current state of the physical equipment on the system (e.g., generators, transmission lines, and substations) through telemetry from their control systems. Maintaining situation awareness of this complex system is already challenging, but recent recognition of the need to also maintain awareness of the integrity and availability of the cyber assets on their systems, compounds the challenge [1], [2] . Cyber security monitoring tools have been successfully deployed on most utility's enterprise networks, but deploying them effectively on control system networks has proven more challenging. Further, there are no proven methods for ensuring cyber security awareness for utility control room staff, because the cyber monitoring tools are designed to be used by dedicated network security staff. Although there have been efforts to define a set of tools to monitor cyber assets on control system networks [3] , those efforts have not necessarily addressed how to keep all relevant entities including control room dispatchers aware of the cyber security on their systems.
One challenge in developing cyber situation awareness visualizations for control room dispatchers is how to provide cyber information that is understandable and actionable without increasing dispatcher workload or contributing to information overload. Control room dispatchers must already monitor a large amount of complex information [4] . Adding additional information, particularly information for which dispatchers have no domain expertise, may add uncertainty and complicate decision making rather than supporting situation awareness. Another challenge is identifying what information is available from existing cyber monitoring tools and how to effectively present that information to relevant entities. Many typical cyber monitoring tools, such as intrusion detection systems (IDS), generate a lot of nuisance alarms if not configured and tuned properly, which may exacerbate information overload problems for dispatchers if the information is not carefully filtered before it is presented to the dispatcher. In order to develop tools that will meet these challenges and provide dispatchers and cyber analysts with the information and the decision making support they need, the breadth and quality of cyber information that is currently available to system operators and cyber security analysts needs to be identified.
Researchers interviewed cyber analysts, engineers, Information Technology (IT), and Operational Technology (OT) professionals that maintain the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) control networks, and identified a list of cyber tools that are typically available or already used on both the utility enterprise networks and on the control system networks. For each of the cyber tools, the researchers identified and characterized the data that are stored or presented in the logs, and how the data could be used. The researchers then identified the functional relationship between the software tools that utilities use to control and monitor the power grid, and the potential consequences of a cyber event either making those tools unavailable or untrusted. The cyber data available was then mapped to the functional consequences to create a characterization of when to notify particular parties (i.e., control room dispatchers, control systems experts, or cyber analysts) and how to inform them of a potential cyber issue. The results of this work inform the design of a tool to enhance cyber situation awareness and help facilitate effective communication between the various roles and organizations with utility and other regional authorities during contingencies.
II. OBSERVATIONS AND INTERVIEWS
In order to develop an effective visualization tool to support situation awareness of cyber security, it is first important to fully understand the context in which the tool will be used. For this research, the context includes both the utility control room and dispatchers who conduct work therein and the network security operation center and the cyber analysts that monitor the network. The researchers conducted a series of observation and interviews at two utilities. The researchers observed control room operations and interviewed dispatchers, and observed cyber analysts in the network security operations center [5] . The results and insights for cyber situation awareness are summarized below.
A. Control Room Dispatchers
The research team conducted observations in the control room of a utility certified to fill the North-American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Transmission Owner (TO), Transmission Operations (TOP), and Transmission Planning (TP) roles as defined in the NERC functional model [2] . There are three primary roles within the control room: transmission dispatcher (TSO), generation dispatcher (AGC), and transmission scheduler (TSS). Each dispatcher works a 12 hour shift that requires weekends and holidays. The TSO is responsible for the physical assets of the transmission system and spends most of the day tracking the load on the various lines under their control, monitoring where field crews are working, and overseeing any scheduled outages. The AGC coordinates with generation utilities in order to maintain the balance between demand for power and the amount supplied. The TSS maintains the public (to other utilities) schedule of power to be carried over the transmission lines and is responsible for alerting other utilities when transmission capacity is available for purchase. While they coordinate, particularly when circumstances are unusual, the three dispatchers operate independently on different information using different displays of the EMS control software.
Information is indirectly shared between the three dispatchers through verbal communication and a shared information display wall at the front of the room. For instance, the physical arrangement of the desks allows the TSS to 'overhear phone conversations the AGC has with generation facilities regarding upcoming levels of generation. The TSS often uses this to adjust the transmission capacity available for sale in upcoming hours. Similarly, the TSO and AGC will coordinate on contingency plans: researchers observed a conversation about the impact of the loss of a specific substation for maintenance and repairs during an unusual, power-consuming heatwave in the area. The shared information display wall is itself divided into designate areas devoted to each of the three desks. The alert/alarm system used by both the TSO and AGC to receive critical updates from SCADA appears on the display wall, as does a schematic of the transmission control area used primarily by the TSO, a dashboard of substation Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) status, and a display for realtime monitoring of generation levels.
Missing from the shared awareness in the control room is any dedicated space or display reflecting the status of cyber assets of the grid. The RTU status dashboard provides binary up/down information for each piece of equipment, but dispatchers must make phone calls and coordinate with field crews and SCADA engineers for other details. Other equipment failures would be noted through the share alarm system, however this system has been designed to provide notification only with little diagnostic support and only minimal indications of cause or impacts of faults.
A further complication for dispatchers: cyber security is not a topic that many dispatchers have a strong training background or familiarity with. While dispatchers can expertly resolve issues with the grid that are the result of physical equipment failures or due to other physical factors such as weather, they do not generally have much experience resolving or working through network issues. This lack of familiarity places a communication barrier between the dispatchers and the supporting staff who are trained to deal with the cyber assets of the grid.
B. Cyber Analysts
In contrast to grid dispatchers, the cyber analysts within the same utility work regular 9 to 5 shifts during standard weekdays and their duties include the real-time monitoring of cyber assets for the utility. Four cyber analysts work independently responding to system-generated alerts based on network activity. Their workflow follows a pattern similar to cyber analysts in other network operation centers. First, they verify that an offense has occurred (that the alert is not a false alarm). This verification involves manually retrieving relevant host and network logs and inspecting them for evidence of misbehavior. Following verification, cyber analysts then must establish a remediation plan and implement it. Cyber analysts will spend some time investigating the cause of an offense and the remediation plan is often derived from the guidelines established by third party security authorities. The alert system is based on a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platform and relies on carefully curated rules.
Here, the cyber analysts of the utility face challenges that are unusual when compared to an average IT enterprise network. Particularly, they do not have complete visibility into all parts of the power grid. Traditional enterprise business systems are usually isolated and segmented into a separate network than 
Logging Tools
• Perform logging of various events that cover data availability, and integrity • Capabilities to flag abnormal operating conditions, parameters exceeding limits, and perform validation of telemetry data, etc.
Third-party Monitoring Tools
• Provide a proxy-based approach by installing software agents on OT devices • Enable access control, automated configuration management, and monitoring capabilities. the SCADA control network which directly operates the grid. Therefore, cyber analysts must rely on remote engineering staff to perform network diagnostics and maintenance. Also, most of the OT SCADA systems are minimally instrumented for cyber monitoring, largely as a result of relying on legacy and/or proprietary technology. As a result, the awareness cyber analysts have over these SCADA control networks is limited.
The mixture of traditional IT enterprise networks and SCADA control networks presents an additional barrier to the complete situation awareness of the cyber analysts. The cyber analysts typically have minimal, if any, training in understanding the operations of the grid. Many of the SCADA devices in the grid for monitoring and control are specialized pieces of equipment that cyber analysts have not had experience working with directly. This compounds the communication barrier between grid dispatchers and cyber security. Without a common language, identifying cyber problems on the grid and collaborating with the right people to handle the situation is hindered. The communication barrier works against a shared awareness of the total state of the power grid that encompasses both traditional IT cyber and SCADA control networks.
C. GridEx Observations
Grid Ex is sponsored by NERC and occurs every two years over a two day period. The initial Grid Ex was conducted in 2011. The purpose of this exercise is to: "Strengthen the industry's capability to respond to and recover from simulated security events affecting the bulk power system [6] . The exercises consist of simulated cybersecurity and physical security threats that provide the participants with an awareness of areas in their systems that need improvement. Grid Ex III was conducted in November 2016 and had over 4,400 participants from 364 industry and government organizations in the US, Canada, and Mexico [7] .
Our project team was able to view participants at a utilitys headquarters as they were participating in the table-top exercise. Multiple scenarios including, physical and cyber-attacks, as well as loss of communications, were simulated to see how personnel communicated and recovered from these attacks. One threat was the insertion of malicious code into SCADA equipment. No monitoring software on the SCADA control network detected this so neither the cyber analysts nor the dispatchers had any idea of this potential attack. It was also evident during the exercise that the cyber analysts were not trained in grid operations and were not knowledgeable about the specifics of the SCADA equipment deployed in the control networks. The dispatchers rely on well-defined procedures for communications and as they have no indications of cyber threats unless notified by the cyber analysts, they rarely would suspect that a cyber-attack is causing an issue. We noted that this was not just an isolated incident in the utility team that our researchers participated in. After the exercise was over, all of the participating organizations were encouraged to share general lessons learned during the exercise. One general recommendation noted that "organizations should review their internal information sharing procedures in the context of large scale events. This will enhance current situation awareness between staff in systems operation in field locations, security personnel, and other business areas. Documentation should be examined to identify opportunities to align incident response by different parts of the organization [7] .
III. CYBER TOOLS AND DATA SOURCES
Based on the interviews with cyber analysts, the researchers compiled a list of cyber tools that are used typically in the IT and OT systems at utilities [8] . Researchers also identified additional, less conventional data sources that could provide inputs to support cyber situation awareness such as operator shift logs, which can provide additional context to events when correlated with more traditional logging tools. This section provides a brief overview of the commonly used IT and OT cybersecurity tools and their functionalities with respect to providing situation awareness.
A. IT -Cyber Tools
The utilities' enterprise systems and networks deploy several mature IT tools and technologies to monitor and detect cyber intrusions. These tools perform various functionalities to not only provide awareness/visibility of connected systems, but also protect computing systems and networks against certain attacks. Table I presents a brief overview of the various types of common IT cybersecurity tools and their key functionalities.
B. OT -Cyber Tools
The development of OT specific cybersecurity monitoring tools and technologies are still at their infancy as OT systems are relatively new and consist of diverse, custom, and often, legacy hardware that run proprietary, and modified real-time operating systems. In fact, the current industry practice is to deploy traditional IT cybersecurity tools and technologies with appropriate customizations to parse and decode OTspecific communication protocols. However, there are several challenges both in terms of the communication protocols, and non-standard, legacy hardware and software platforms that often limit the effectiveness of IT-specific tools. However, there are certain OT-specific tools that enable monitoring and configuration management that are used by the utility industry specifically to ensure a certain level of situation awareness. Table I also presents a quick overview of the OT-specific tools and their key functionalities.
C. Other data sources
In addition to monitoring alerts and logs from cyber tools such as IDS and SIEM, cyber analysts monitor email alerts from external entities which inform them about emerging threats. These alerts come from the NERC Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and the Department of Energys Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center (JC3) incident reporting system. Cyber analysts monitor their email continuously and when one of these alerts appears, one of the analysts in the Network and Security Operations Center (NSOC) takes responsibility for investigating whether it impacts the utilitys systems and following up with mitigation if needed. Integrating these alerts into a visualization tool will enhance situation awareness of emerging threats.
Dispatchers maintain entry logs for substations, which include who details about field personnel and specifics about their repair/maintenance work. Additionally, dispatchers maintain daily logs detailing alarm response, summarizing results of phone calls with outside entities and any other events which may have an operational impact. These logs could be incorporated as a data source to add additional context to information gathered from cyber tool logs. This could flag cyber incidents as higher or lower priority, for example a firmware update on an RTU paired with authorized entry for RTU maintenance could be flagged as low priority because it might be expected given the additional context.
In order for this information to be effectively integrated into a cyber visualization tool, the information contained in the threat alerts and dispatcher logs will need to be recorded in a format that can be read and correlated with other logging tools. Typically, this means the information needs to be somewhat standardized. The format and content of the shift logs is not standardized and depends largely on the individual writing the logs. Providing dispatchers with a form to complete their daily logs may encourage consistency. Information from E-ISAC can be variable as well, depending on the type of the threat.
IV. CRITICAL SYSTEMS, IMPACTS, AND CYBER SOURCES
Based on the result of the observations and interviews, the researchers concluded that control room dispatchers should only be alerted to cyber issues or events if one of the systems they rely on to control and monitor the system is impacted. Along these lines, we can classify the impacts to the system in terms of two key properties, namely observability and controllability. Observability refers to the ability to be able to see and infer the true system states from the available data at the control center. Controllability refers to the ability of the control center to be able to adjust the system's operating conditions through actions such as regulation of grid frequency, dispatching generation resources, transmission line switching, etc.,
In addition to the issue of when to notify, the researchers identified that it is critical to not overload the dispatchers with all the alerts from the various cyber tools as part of their displays for situation awareness. Therefore, one of the key 
Control Center -EMS Alarms & Logging
Observability: Improper functioning of the EMS' alarming system could lead to missing early warning signs of disturbances and lead to major instability and cascading outages. Also, a compromise of logging system would limit or impair post-event analysis to identify root causes.
Controllability: Loss of alarming would result in no control during disturbances, whereas incorrect alarming could trigger/amplify new/existing disturbances potentially leading to instability and cascading outages. Observability: Lack of information about outages and planned schedules would limit operator awareness about current operating conditions and reserves.
Controllability: Loss of connectivity or improper functioning of outage management and scheduling systems could lead to incorrect operator control actions and dispatches that could impact system reserves.
OT -Logging tools
IT -Firewalls and Network-based IDS/IPS For suspected or known compromise, alert scheduling dispatcher immediately. Provide instructions for maintaining reliability using alternate sources of outage and scheduling information, if available. If neighboring utilities and other entities have access to valid information from these systems, provide support for coordinating.
Generation

Sites -Generation Management Systems
Observability: Loss of observability for generating sites would lead to manual operation and could cause larger generation/load imbalances and uneconomic operation.
Controllability: Loss of control or incorrect control for a generating station could lead to large generation/load balances, unhealthy operating conditions for the generators leading to equipment damage, and economic impacts.
OT -Anomaly Detection Systems
IT -Firewalls and Network-based IDS/IPS Alert generation dispatch and inform that manual control of generation will be necessary. Provide communication tools (e.g., contact information) to facilitate coordination with generation facilities. Observability: Losing SCADA telemetry from the control center would result in limited substation automation and/or manual operations using local field measurements.
Controllability: Loss of control via SCADA would lead to local protection and control measures at the substations. Malicious control commands from SCADA to field equipment could trigger outages and potentially cause reliability impacts.
OT -Anomaly Detection Systems, Vendorspecific tools, Thirdparty tools
IT -Firewalls and Network-based IDS/IPS
Inform dispatchers that substation information is compromised. Provide information to facilitate dispatch of field crews to affected locations and coordinate response. Provide instructions for manual actions where necessary and inform impacted neighboring entities (e.g., if automatic contingencies are affected).
TABLE II CRITICAL SYSTEMS, IMPACTS, TOOLS AND DISPATCHER CONSIDERATIONS
considerations is to develop a visualization approach that leverages an underlying alert correlation mechanism that parses the various individual alerts generated (IT, OT, physical, and external sources), queries and correlates similar events, and maps them to potential impacts on the critical cyber assets that the dispatchers depend on to monitor/control the grid. Though it is noted that performing such a mapping and correlation of alerts for all possible scenarios is a hard problem to solve, the researchers hope to develop a modular and extensible approach to show its value in enhancing situation awareness. Table II lists the various critical systems with respect to a utility control center's situation awareness, the impacts to observability and controllability if they are compromised, and a high-level description of specific considerations for the dispatcher about when/why they would care.
V. TOOLS TO INFORM DISPATCHER SITUATION AWARENESS
The researchers used the mapping between the critical systems, the impacts, and the relevant cyber tools to develop an initial concept for the cyber visualization to support situation awareness. The concept, illustrated in Figure 1 . focuses on several principles which were derived from the observations and interviews. First, the design features information to support awareness of what is happening regionally as well as locally. There are data connection heartbeats at the top to indicate active data links to other entities, and neighboring utilities or regions that are experiencing cyber issues are highlighted in an overview map. Both of these tools would support more global awareness of cyber security and may enable faster identification and mitigation of a coordinated cyber-attack like those simulated in the GridEx exercise. Second, the design shows cyber alerts in the context of which systems are affected. The cyber information is embedded into a control system network schematic, which will support quick identification of the impact of a cyber issue by highlighting the affected system. Third, the design takes all the relevant alerts form disparate sources of information and incorporates them into a single display, which may reduce the amount of time required in investigating alerts. Rather than getting an alert and then drilling down into several different systems to identify the impact, the information is presented directly on the dashboard. This design is intended for use by the control room dispatchers, although a similar display could be used by cyber analysts. This would facilitate timely communication between the control room and the cyber analysts by providing them SCADA information and context that they are missing now.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this research was to characterize what cyber tools are currently available for monitoring electric grid control systems, and how to utilize those tools to enhance situation awareness of cyber security for control room dispatchers. The observations and interviews revealed that adding cyber security data without providing operators with actionable information would contribute to information overload. The observations and interviews also revealed that one of the main challenges is coordinating information and communication across multiple entities and within the same organization between staff across different disciplines. The researchers developed a preliminary design concept to support coordination within utilities and across relevant entities outside the utility to enhance global situation awareness of cyber security on the power grid. The design concept is based on utilization of commonly used logging information and cyber tools. However, effective filtering of information to avoid overloading the control room dispatcher will require development of correlation engines that can take the data from the disparate sources and only send alerts to the operators if there is a potential operational consequence to the cyber event.
